Some comments on the Xi Jinping – Truong Tan Sang talks

Posted on 20/07/2013 by bxvn1

Translated by Nam Việt

Nineteen days after Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung had delivered his address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in which he indicated a switch in foreign policy towards the United States, President Truong Tan Sang traveled to Beijing to hold talks with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping on the comprehensive strategic cooperation between the two countries. Then, the two leaders witnessed the signing of 10 cooperation documents, including:

  1. A joint action plan between the Governments of Vietnam and China on implementing the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.
  2. A cooperative agreement between the two Ministries of Defense.
  3. An agreement between Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and China’s Ministry of Agriculture on the establishment of a hotline for unexpected incidents in fishing activity at sea.
  4. A framework agreement between the two governments on China’s provision of a preferential credit worth 320 million RMB for Vietnam’s railway information system.
  5. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two Governments on establishing a cultural center in each country.
  6. The working statutes of the Vietnam -China Joint Committee on Land Border Gate Management.
  7. An agreement between the Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine on cooperation for import and export animal and plant quarantine.
  8. A cooperation plan between the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO) and China’s People’s External Friendship Association in the 2013-2017 period.
  9. An agreement on preferential buyer’s credit worth 45 million USD for the NinhBinh Urea Plant project.
  10. The 4th revisions to an agreement between the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group (PVN) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) on the joint exploration in agreed offshore areas in the Gulf of Tonkin. 

President Sang’s trip ended with a8-point joint statement of approximately 5,000 words.The first point of the joint statement stressed that the goal of the summit is to “…deepen the Viet Nam-China comprehensive strategic cooperation…” which was discussed and agreed before. The second point reaffirmed that both parties commit to consistently following “the motto of 16 words” and the “spirit of 4 good points” in the long term development of the relationship between the 2 countries.

Based on the first two points 1 and 2, the third point is the most important because it summarizes 13 areas of cooperation between the branches of governments as set out in the“joint action plan between the Governments of Vietnam and China on implementing the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”.

This plan was speedily discussed (according to Vietnam News Agency newsletter) in the 6th session of the Steering Committee of bilateral cooperation in Beijing on May 11, 2013, and the draft of this plan was officially signed into Document No. 1 in President Truong Tan Sang’s visit to China. This document serves as the fundamental one that pointed out the main goal of the talks between the leaders of the two countries which is to “continue to develop in-depth cooperation” and “to promote the Vietnam-China ties to a new height”. The remaining 9 documents itemize details of cooperation between ministries in all areas.

In Xi Jinping – Truong Tan Sang talks, a number of events should be examined thoroughly:

  1. Objectives “continueto develop in depth cooperation” and ““to promote the Vietnam-China ties to a new height” are stressed by the President of Vietnam and the Chinese ambassador to Hanoi in two separate interviews (China’s press with President Truong Tan Sang and Vietnam’s newspapers with the Chinese ambassador) right before the China trip of Vietnam’s president. Apparently this is a strong response to the address of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung at Shangri-La Forum on May 31. Those document prepared prior to Shangri-La Dialogue were quickly summarized from the agreementsreached in the meetings of the Steering Committee on bilateral cooperation and the theoretical seminarsbetween the 2 communist parties over the past several years. The fact that document No.1 was “speedily discussed” at the meeting of the Steering Committee on May 11 revealed that Beijing had received secret reportsabout the switch of foreign policy towards the United States of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, so they decided to act quickly by allying to Nguyen Tan Dung’s political rivals in the country.
  2. President Truong Tan Sang is known as anti-hegemonic policies of Beijing. When taking office in July 2011, he stated before the Congress that he was determined to protect country’s independence, sovereigntyand territorial integrity. His first mission abroad was to India in November 2011 while the General Secretary of the communist party was on his way to China. Just two months ago, he visited the fishermen in Ly Son island in QuangNgai province helping and consoling victims of Chinese attacks at sea and encouraged the fishermen to maintain their traditional works, solidarity and mutual assistance in order to cope with natural disasters andhostile activity at sea. Now, two years after taking office, he made his first trip to China. This event could be interpreted as follows: Xi Jinping, in his efforts to prevent Nguyen Tan Dung’s switch in foreign policy towards the United States,realized that China should reassure Truong Tan Sang and support him in the power struggle against Nguyen Tan Dung. Xi Jinpingdid not engage Nguyen PhuTrong because this person is almost openly pro-China and because, in the other hand, the Vietnam-China relations should be dealt with by the Presidents. Meanwhile, though he dislikes China, Truong Tan Sang still needs to rely on this powerful neighbor to protect the communist party and the political regime. Therefore, the two sides have tried to reduce tension and to increase cooperation with a mutually beneficial outcome.
  3. Another scenario is also possible: Facing the risk that the communist party may collapse because of on-going fierce internal power struggle and that a common global trend is to curb unruly expansionpolicy of China, the leaders of the communist party and the State of Vietnam might have reached some consensus internally which is to readjust the foreign policy and make it less inclined to China. Therefore, while continuing to develop cooperative relations with Beijing, Hanoi also increase strategic cooperation with the United States and other powers. To the United States, Vietnam’s swing politics does not matter because the U.S. has no ambition on territory or territorial waters of any country in the region, but to China, this is totally different. Over the past thousands of years, China has never given up the intention of invading and then HannizingVietnam. Therefore, it is very difficult for Vietnam’s re-adjusted foreign policy, if any, to survive under a long standing threat from China, if there is no guarantee from the international community or from a strategic defense partnership as in the case of the United States with Japan or Taiwan. In addition, this consensus scenario of the communist party of Vietnam is still an assumption, nothing is certain.

Back to Vietnam – China relations after Xi Jinping – Truong Tan Sang talks, the ideas of in-depth cooperation development and promoting the ties to a new height are stated in the joint statement with 10 detailed documents of the “joint action plan between the Governments of Vietnam and China on implementing the Vietnam-China comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”.

Apart from analyzing the political factors that lead to Xi – Sang talks, it is essential to review carefully 10 signed documents to recognize the advantages and disadvantages of Vietnam in each area of cooperation. As the writer of this article has not read the full text of those documents and also due to the limitation of an article, the writer could only make some general comments about the basis and the outcome of this bilateral summit:

  1. The talks took place on the basis of the 16-word and 4-good-point principle which is obsolete while reality proves that Vietnam has been cheated by the Chinese flowery rhetoric. In fact, China has used “unilateral might, groundless claims, and actions that run counter to international law and stem from imposition and power politics”, as Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung implied in his Shangri La speech. The Xi – Sang talks should have aimed at improving the relationship between the 2 countries by commitments to cease all actions imposingunequal treatment, not humanitarian and not respecting for international law. The fact that the joint statement absolutely did not mention the Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC) is a deliberate omission which is very harmful to Vietnam and other ASEAN countries.
  2. Some agreements sound positive such as setting up a hotline to deal with unexpected incidentsin fishing activities at sea, cooperation for import and export animal and plant quarantine, preferential buyer’s credit for the NinhBinh Urea Plant project. The question is whether or not those projects would be implemented effectively.
  3. An agreement that can be potentially controversial is that on the expansion of area for joint exploration of oil and gas in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is necessary to evaluate the risks and benefits for Vietnam.
  4. Document No. 4 is on a preferential credit for the railway information system project. In fact, this is the project for Pingxiang – Lang Son – Hanoiexpressway. Thisprojected highway connecting Pingxiang (Guangxi) to Hanoi would bring about certain economic benefits but could also be dangerous for Vietnam if unfortunately, military conflict take place between the two countries.
  5. Document No. 5 is about Vietnamese – China cultural exchange, with the establishing of cultural centers of one country in another and vice versa. This could be a double-edged knife if used by China as a means of assimilatingthe Vietnamese.

In summary, the outcome of the Xi Jinping – Truong Tan Sang talks appears positive with some prospective of reducing tensions and increasing cooperation, but it still implied the hidden intention of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s leaders themselves are still confusedbetween one side being their desire to protect the communist party and the political regime and the other side being the discontent of the people and anincreasing aspiration for democracy.

Vietnam’s communist leaders need to realize that, instead of following China, if they choose the path of democratizationin policy towards China, then with the support of the people and the democratic world, they will succeed in the just and sound mission: protecting and developing the country. The true choice is to reconcile with the dissidents, to listen to and to work with the intellectuals. As with China, if that country also changes its political regime from dictatorship to democracy, it would not be isolated and would be accepted by the world as a superpower. Then China will also have the respect and support from Asian countries. The East Sea will be calm. The world will be peaceful. This is an important message to the leaders and people of China.

Nguồn bản gốc:

https://boxitvn.online/bai/17181

http://boxitvn.blogspot.be/2013/06/mot-so-nhan-inh-ve-cuoc-hoi-am-tap-can.html

 

 

 

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